When to Talk and When to Fight: The Strategic Choice Between Dialogue and Resistance by Rebecca Subar

When to Talk and When to Fight: The Strategic Choice Between Dialogue and Resistance by Rebecca Subar

Author:Rebecca Subar [Subar, Rebecca]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781629638362
Goodreads: 53125729
Publisher: PM Press
Published: 2021-07-06T00:00:00+00:00


Structural Barriers

Structural barriers can be so formidable that they block weaker groups from following an effective strategy. Those structural barriers may be the root of the conflict in the first place. But even when groups are fighting over something more malleable, there may be structural barriers that limit them from making a claim for what they need or want. Raed and Malek just want to get on their planes and go home; they ask with courtesy, and though they may show or hide their anger, the decision about whether or not they will board is not up to them. The currencies of power that weaker parties hold are devalued, which leaves little space for building power; Column B action is out of the question. What can a weaker party do when faced with structural barriers?

Sometimes individuals and groups that cannot mobilize try to reach out to the stronger group, placing their hope in the possibility of listening, dialogue, and negotiation. Like a person deep in debt and pleading with the debt collector, it may be tempting to try to appeal to the stronger party’s humanity. As you know, when the more powerful group is a lot more powerful, this doesn’t usually work.

Have you heard of the ancient kingdom of Melos? Possibly not, because in 416 BCE the whole population of this small Greek island was destroyed by the army of Athens. This was during the Peloponnesian Wars, and the Athenians were on a roll. They sent a delegation to little Melos with a choice: submit to us as slaves, or we’ll kill you all. The Melians tried to talk the Athenians out of it. You can guess what happened.

What could the Melians have done? What were their alternatives to negotiating with the Athenians? What could they have done unilaterally, without consent or buy-in from the Athenians? They could have submitted to slavery, tried to fight the Athenians off, or run to the hills. They could have reached out to the neighboring islands for backup. They could have committed mass suicide. Which was the least awful of these alternatives—that is, what was the Melians’ BATNA? Was their best alternative to negotiate with the Athenians, who were asking the Melians to submit to slavery? Was dignity the most important value at play here, such that the Melians might have considered a futile fight, or even suicide, a better choice than submission?

We know from the historian Thucydides that the weaker Melians did indeed value their dignity most of all and saw negotiation as the most promising way to maintain their self-respect. “It were surely great baseness and cowardice in us who are still free not to try everything that can be tried, before submitting to your yoke,” they said.2 Yes, it can be tempting for a desperate weaker party to go to Column A to attempt to talk it out with an entrenched, much stronger power, but we can expect the weaker group to face the fate of the Melians.

Sometimes the weaker party



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